

A Literature Review on the Regulation of Microfinance Institution's: Case Studies of Senegal and Morocco

Wahiba BOUDRAA

*Faculté d'Économie et de Gestion, Laboratoire des Sciences Économiques et Politiques
Publiques, Université Ibn Tofail, Kénitra, Maroc*

Mounir EL BAKKOUCHI

*Faculté d'Économie et de Gestion, Laboratoire des Sciences Économiques et Politiques
Publiques, Université Ibn Tofail, Kénitra, Maroc*

Abstract. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are essential drivers of financial inclusion in developing economies like Senegal, yet their regulatory frameworks struggle to reconcile institutional stability with client protection. This study investigates the adaptation of MFI regulation to crises, with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on a qualitative case study methodology, we analyze Senegal's regulatory evolution through document review of the PARMEC Law, BCEAO directives (2008–2023), and data from CAURIE-MF, a leading Senegalese MFI. Post-2010 reforms strengthened prudential oversight, but the COVID-19 crisis exposed vulnerabilities in liquidity support and client safeguards. While temporary measures such as loan moratoria sustained sector stability, reliance on self-reported MFI data constrains comprehensive long-term risk evaluation. Comparative insights from Morocco underscore the advantages of Bank Al-Maghrib's centralized supervision. Our findings advocate adaptive regulatory frameworks, regional harmonization within WAEMU, and independent monitoring to bolster resilience. Senegal's experience provides actionable lessons for reconciling financial inclusion with effective crisis management.

Keywords: *Microfinance regulation, Financial resilience, Crisis adaptation, Client protection, COVID-19, Senegal, Morocco.*

1. Introduction

Microfinance has emerged as a pivotal development instrument aimed at expanding financial inclusion among low-income and unbanked populations. It encompasses a wide range of financial services, including microcredit, microsavings, microinsurance, and other tailored products designed to meet the specific needs of vulnerable clients. Over recent decades, the sector has experienced significant expansion, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate with a dual objective: achieving social performance (SP) through poverty alleviation and ensuring financial performance (FP) to maintain long-term institutional sustainability.

Despite its recognised potential, microfinance remains subject to ongoing debate regarding the appropriate scope and intensity of regulatory oversight. On the one hand, proponents argue that robust regulation is essential to safeguard clients, enhance transparency, and ensure the stability of financial systems. On the other hand, critics contend that excessive or poorly designed regulation may constrain innovation, limit outreach, and undermine the social mission of MFIs. This tension becomes particularly pronounced during periods of crisis, such as economic shocks or global pandemics, when regulatory frameworks are required to adapt rapidly in order to preserve both institutional resilience and financial inclusion outcomes.

In the context of West Africa, and Senegal in particular, financial inclusion frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped and continue to evolve. Although existing studies have explored the

operational performance of MFIs, limited attention has been devoted to understanding how crises reshape regulatory and supervisory mechanisms in such environments. This gap is particularly relevant considering the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exposed structural vulnerabilities while simultaneously accelerating regulatory and institutional transformations.

The research question guiding this study is therefore formulated as follows:

How have the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing microfinance institutions in Senegal and Morocco adapted to crisis situations, and what lessons can be drawn to strengthen sector resilience while maintaining a balance between financial inclusion and institutional stability?

This study makes a threefold contribution to the existing literature. First, it addresses a significant research gap by examining the impact of crisis contexts—particularly the COVID-19 pandemic—on regulatory and supervisory practices in West African microfinance systems, a dimension that remains insufficiently explored. Second, it provides a structured comparative analysis of Senegal and Morocco, two countries characterized by distinct regulatory models, thereby offering transferable insights for other member states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Third, it develops an in-depth case study of CAURIE-MF, illustrating how regulatory frameworks are operationalized at the institutional level and how MFIs adapt in practice to systemic shocks.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature on microfinance regulation, with particular emphasis on hybrid regulatory models and the challenges specific to developing economies. Section 3 outlines the research methodology and justifies the choice of data and case study. Section 4 presents the descriptive findings only, including the evolution of the sector, the regulatory frameworks, and the analysis of the CAURIE-MF case. Section 5 discusses these findings, offering causal interpretation, theoretical contributions, and operational policy recommendations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and proposes directions for future research.

Figure 1. Regulation and crisis resilience in microfinance: Senegal vs. Morocco




Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between regulation and resilience of microfinance institutions during crises, with a comparison between Senegal and Morocco. Table 1 presents the key definitions used in this study.

Table 1. Key Definitions Used in the Study

Term	Definition	Source
Micro savings	Small, flexible deposit services tailored to low-income clients, offering secure ways to accumulate funds outside traditional banks.	World Bank (2014) – “Financial Inclusion and Stability”)
Micro insurance	Low-cost coverage for specific risks (e.g., health, crops) with simplified claims processes. It prioritizes affordability over comprehensiveness.	Churchill ((2006) – “Protecting the Poor: A Microinsurance Compendium”)
Financial Performance	The ability of a microfinance institution to remain operationally sustainable while reaching low-income clients, measured by yield, efficiency, and risk indicators.	Ledgerwood ((1999) – “Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial Perspective” (réédité 2013))
Late Start	The delayed development or adoption of microfinance services relative to global or regional trends.	CGAP ((2004) – “Building Inclusive Financial Systems”)
Debt Crisis	Widespread borrower defaults undermining institutional sustainability, often caused by over indebtedness or lax risk assessment.	Roodman ((2012) – “Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance”); CGAP ((2010) – “Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh”)
Code of Conduct	A set of ethical principles and operational guidelines ensuring transparency, accountability, and fairness in stakeholder relations.	Author’s synthesis (2025)

2. Literature review

Microfinance has become a prominent tool for reducing poverty and advancing financial inclusion, drawing significant scholarly interest in recent decades. Foundational theories such as stakeholder theory (Mercier, 2010) and relationship marketing (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) have provided valuable insights into the trust-based relationships that underpin microfinance systems. Within Africa, research has often focused on the delicate balance that microfinance institutions (MFIs) must strike between achieving financial sustainability and fulfilling social objectives (Mfossa et al., 2013; Pigé, 2011).

At the international level, a key scholarly debate revolves around the rise of hybrid regulatory regimes designed to balance the dual goals of financial stability and social mission. This dual objective necessitates a regulatory approach that combines prudential regulation (ensuring financial soundness and stability) with non-prudential regulation (focusing on consumer protection, ethical conduct, and social performance), creating a hybrid supervisory model. A significant tension exists between financial performance (FP) and social outreach, the management of which is crucial for long-term institutional sustainability (Smith et al., 2021; Kumar & Lee, 2022). While many studies provide valuable descriptive accounts of regulatory frameworks, recent work calls for a deeper, more analytical approach to measuring institutional resilience through objective, quantitative indicators (Garcia & Morris, 2023).

Senegal has frequently been cited as a case study for financial inclusion, especially in relation to extending services to marginalized and low-income groups. Scholars have highlighted

ongoing challenges in tailoring financial products to the unique socioeconomic circumstances of clients (Diop, 2020; Gassama, 2011). Recent studies have also investigated innovative approaches, such as the integration of Islamic finance principles with microfinance to support the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (Seck, 2019).

The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified attention on the need for regulatory flexibility and institutional resilience within African financial sectors. Bini Smaghi (2021), for example, illustrates how emergency responses during the pandemic exposed both structural weaknesses and opportunities for reform within the microfinance ecosystem. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of comprehensive research examining how post pandemic regulatory changes are reshaping the strategic and supervisory environment for MFIs, particularly within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Recent IMF working papers (e.g., IMF, 2022) underscore the urgency of strengthening financial oversight and accelerating digital transformation to protect inclusion gains in the aftermath of the crisis.

Additionally, while Senegal operates under the PARMEC Law, recent regulatory reforms in other WAEMU countries—such as Benin’s 2021 microfinance overhaul—reflect a broader regional movement toward harmonized, risk-based supervisory models. Despite their significance, comparative studies of these regulatory frameworks remain limited, leaving important questions about institutional divergence and best practices unanswered.

To address these gaps, the present study contributes to the literature by providing a comparative analysis of Senegal and Morocco. It adds empirical evidence on how distinct regulatory frameworks impact the balance between financial resilience and social performance, with a particular focus on developments in the post-pandemic period. The analysis centers on the interplay between regulatory architecture, social performance, and governance reforms in fostering inclusive financial systems.

3. Materials and Methods

This study employed a qualitative case study methodology to investigate the regulatory and supervisory dynamics influencing microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Senegal, with a comparative perspective on Morocco. The research design integrated multiple data sources and analytical approaches to ensure a comprehensive and reproducible examination.

a. Data Sources and Collection

i. Document Analysis

The study analyzed key legal and regulatory texts, including the PARMEC Law (Law No. 95-03) and its subsequent amendments, BCEAO directives issued between 2008 and 2023, and official reports from Senegal’s Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The selection of these documents is justified for three reasons. First, the PARMEC Law and BCEAO directives constitute the official legal and regulatory framework governing microfinance institutions in Senegal and the WAEMU region, making them essential for understanding formal obligations and supervisory mechanisms. Second, the 2008–2023 period was chosen because it covers both the post-PARMEC reforms and the COVID-19 pandemic response, allowing analysis of regulatory adaptation to crisis. Third, Ministry reports provide official data on sector performance and policy implementation, complementing the legal analysis with empirical evidence. For the comparative analysis, regulatory frameworks from Morocco, including Law 18-97 and reports from Bank Al-Maghrib, were also examined.

ii. Institutional Data

Case Selection and Rationale: CAURIE-MF, a leading Senegalese MFI, was selected as the focal institution for its significant role in supporting women entrepreneurs, its organizational transformation, and its documented adaptability during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The selection of CAURIE-MF as a single case study is justified for four methodological reasons. First, CAURIE-MF is representative of Senegalese MFIs due to its size (108,700 clients, 10 branches), legal status (licensed Savings and Credit Cooperative), and client profile (96% women), making it a typical case within the sector. Second, the institution's 15-year operational history (2005–2020) allows analysis of regulatory adaptation across different phases: initial registration, licensing, and crisis response. Third, CAURIE-MF's documented resilience during COVID-19—including its participation in the PRES loan moratorium program—makes it a critical case for examining how regulatory frameworks support or hinder crisis adaptation. Fourth, the public availability of its audited annual reports ensures transparency and replicability of the analysis. While single case studies have inherent limitations for generalization, CAURIE-MF's typical characteristics provide valid insights applicable to similar MFIs in the WAEMU region.

Its prominence and the public availability of its operational data made it a suitable and valuable case for in depth qualitative analysis. Although single case studies have inherent limitations regarding generalizability, CAURIE-MF's characteristics provide critical insights into how MFIs operate within and respond to the Senegalese regulatory environment.

Institutional publications, internal performance metrics, and post pandemic strategy documents from CAURIE-MF (2019) were reviewed. All institutional data used were self-reported and publicly available.

The choice of institutional data is justified by three criteria. First, CAURIE-MF's publicly available annual reports provide consistent, comparable, and verifiable data over multiple years, enabling longitudinal analysis. Second, the data include both financial indicators (loan portfolio, savings portfolio, PAR) and social indicators (percentage of women clients, number of borrowers), allowing assessment of the dual MFI mission. Third, the 2019 baseline was chosen because it represents the last full year of normal operations before the COVID-19 pandemic, serving as a reference point for crisis impact analysis.

iii. Secondary Sectoral Data

Sector-wide data from BCEAO and Bank Al-Maghrib were utilized to complement institutional insights and provide a broader context for the comparative analysis. While these data are comprehensive at the sectoral level, they lack granularity at the individual institution level.

b. Analytical Approach

The study began with a comprehensive literature review to establish theoretical and conceptual foundations. Triangulation of data sources—including legal texts, institutional reports, and sectoral statistics—enabled a nuanced understanding of how regulatory frameworks operate in practice, particularly during systemic disruptions such as the COVID-19 crisis. The comparative analysis between Senegal and Morocco was developed by synthesizing findings from these diverse data sources to highlight convergences and divergences in regulatory approaches and outcomes. No new computer code or software tools were developed for this study.

All principal operational and conceptual terms are anchored in internationally recognized definitions established by leading authorities, ensuring conceptual precision and methodological rigor.

4. Results

a. Evolution of the Microfinance Sector: A General Overview

i. Historical phases of development (1975–2005)

Table 2 presents the different historical phases of microfinance development.

Table 2. Key Historical Development Years (1975–2005)

Year	Phase	Key Characteristics
1975	The emergence	Localized experiments based on group lending; support from public donors (subsidies).
1985	Growth Phase	Establishment of large microfinance institutions; commercial orientation of microfinance.
1995	The Euphoria	Heightened interest from states and international organizations; 1997: First Microcredit Summit campaign.
2005	Maturity?	Financial transparency, professionalization; divergences on interest rates, consumer credit, non-financial services.

ii. History of microfinance in Morocco

The history of microfinance in Morocco is relatively recent, with the first microcredit activities appearing in the early 1990s.

Despite this late start, the sector rapidly developed, making Morocco a leader in microcredit in the Arab world, accounting for over 40% of the region's clients. However, in 2007, the sector experienced a debt crisis that prompted the government and various institutions to propose measures to improve the supervision and management of the microfinance environment.


These measures included the creation of the private credit bureau Experian Maroc and the merger of the Zakoura Foundation with the Banque Populaire Foundation. Since the debt crisis ended in 2011, the sector's prospects have improved. In October 2012, several objectives were set for the sector at the first International Microfinance Symposium, including reaching a total of 3.2 million beneficiaries by 2020.

iii. Objectives of a Microfinance Institution

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically pursue three strategic objectives: impact, outreach, and financial viability. Impact refers to targeting specific demographics, ensuring the suitability of offered services, and fostering client satisfaction and institutional loyalty. Outreach is measured by the number of clients served and the geographical coverage achieved. Financial viability focuses on cost coverage, growth financing, and maintaining a controlled financial policy.

Figure 2 illustrates the three strategic objectives pursued by microfinance institutions: impact, outreach, and financial viability.

Figure 2. MFI Strategic Objectives: Impact, Outreach, Financial Viability



b. Current Microfinance Products

i. Microinsurance

Provides low-income populations, often excluded from traditional insurance systems, with accessible, affordable, and tailored protection against risks, addressing their specific socio-economic vulnerabilities.

ii. Microsavings

Refers to the allocation of savings to activities with a social purpose, reflecting a financial strategy aimed at both securing personal resources and supporting socially beneficial initiatives, particularly in contexts where traditional financial services are limited.

iii. Microcredit

A core component of microfinance, involves providing small loans to low-income families, enabling them to undertake productive activities, generate income, and establish sustainable microenterprises.

c. Key Microfinance Stakeholders in Morocco

Table 3 lists the main partners and stakeholders of the microfinance sector in Morocco.

Table 3. Key Microfinance Stakeholders in Morocco

Agency Name
USAID
Millennium Challenge Corporation – Agency for the Partnership for Progress (APP)
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)
French Development Agency (AFD)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Although the primary focus of this study is on Senegal, a concise overview of the microfinance sector in Morocco is provided to offer comparative perspective. Morocco's sophisticated regulatory and institutional infrastructure serves as a valuable benchmark for understanding how varying national contexts influence microfinance practices. This comparison underscores the diversity of supervisory models, legal frameworks, and stakeholder coordination mechanisms found across the African continent.

d. Legal framework, regulation, and supervision

i. Legal Framework for Microfinance in Morocco

The Moroccan microfinance sector is primarily regulated by two key pieces of legislation:

- **Law on Associations of 15 November 1958:** Amended in 2002, this law provides the foundational legal structure for the operation of associations, including many microfinance institutions.
- **Law 18-97 on Microcredit (Dahir of 15 February 1996):** This law specifically addresses microcredit activities. Amendments to Law 18-97 have broadened the scope of MFIs to include loans for social housing renovation, access to clean water, and electricity.

ii. Role of the National Federation of Microcredit Associations (FNAM)

Established under Law 58-03 of 6 May 2004 (which amended Law 18-97), FNAM serves as the representative body for microfinance institutions in Morocco. Its key functions include:

- Representing MFIs before public authorities.
- Establishing an ethical code of conduct for the sector.
- Proposing actions to promote the development of microfinance in Morocco.

This framework aims to create an enabling environment for the growth of the micro-finance sector while also ensuring responsible lending practices and protecting vulnerable populations.

iii. Regulation of Microfinance in Morocco

The microfinance sector in Morocco is regulated and supervised by Bank Al-Maghrib (the central bank), with direct oversight from the Banking Supervision Bureau within the Department of Financial Institutions Supervision. Bank Al-Maghrib, in consultation with the National Federation of Microcredit Associations (FNAM), defines prudential rules for the sector.

Key aspects of the regulatory framework include:

- ❖ **Governance Directive (2009):** The Directive on the Governance of Microfinance Associations, issued in September 2009, establishes regulatory requirements for MFIs.
- ❖ **On-site Supervision:** Since 2006, Bank Al-Maghrib has conducted regular on-site visits to MFIs to assess operational practices, governance, internal controls, loan portfolio quality, and regulatory compliance. These supervisory activities have been strengthened, allowing the Bank to intervene in MFI operations when necessary.
- ❖ **Intervention Powers:** Bank Al-Maghrib can direct improvements in operational procedures, require write-offs of non-performing loans, enforce transparency practices, and ensure adherence to client protection guidelines.

This regulatory framework aims to promote the stability and soundness of the micro-finance sector while also ensuring responsible lending practices and client protection, aligning with

broader goals of financial inclusion and sustainable development. The involvement of FNAM in defining prudential rules also suggests an effort to balance regulatory oversight with industry expertise and needs.

iv. Supervision in Microfinance

Supervision in microfinance encompasses the regulation, monitoring, and oversight of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to ensure effective and ethical operations compliant with local regulations. It aims to protect both borrowers and depositors, promoting financial inclusion while managing risks. This oversight is particularly crucial given the vulnerability of low-income populations served by MFIs.

Key aspects of microfinance supervision include:

- Regulation: Establishing and enforcing rules that govern MFI operations.
- Monitoring and Oversight: Regularly assessing MFI activities to ensure compliance and identify potential risks.
- Consumer Protection: Implementing measures to safeguard borrowers from unfair practices.
- Promotion of Financial Inclusion: Encouraging MFIs to expand access to financial services for underserved populations.
- Risk Management: Ensuring that MFIs have systems in place to manage financial and operational risks effectively.

Supervision in microfinance is critical for balancing sector growth with the protection of vulnerable borrowers and promoting long-term stability, increasingly requiring attention to ESG factors.

Supervision mechanisms rely on a dual-pronged framework of regulatory instruments, categorized primarily into those addressing financial stability (prudential) and those concerned with broader compliance and operational standards (non-prudential). The subsequent discussion will elucidate these two dimensions in greater detail.

v. Prudential and Non-Prudential Regulations

a) Prudential Regulation

Prudential regulation involves financial authorities establishing rules to supervise financial institutions. Its primary goal is to ensure financial system stability, protect stakeholders, and prevent crises.

b) "Non-Prudential" Regulation

Although the term non-prudential regulation is not conventionally used in financial literature, it can effectively refer to forms of oversight that fall outside the traditional scope of financial stability measures. These are sometimes described as regulations beyond prudential oversight, and they encompass a broad range of domains such as environmental protection, public health, and client protection. Such regulations are designed to govern institutional behavior in a manner that safeguards societal interests, ensuring that microfinance institutions operate in a responsible and ethically sound way, aligned with broader goals of sustainable development.

vi. Multiple levels of regulation and control

In Morocco, the regulatory framework governing microfinance institutions is structured across several interconnected tiers, each playing a vital role in promoting effective governance, safeguarding client interests, and ensuring the sector's long-term viability. This multi-layered

approach encompasses a continuum of oversight mechanisms from governmental supervision to internal institutional controls each contributing distinct functions that collectively uphold the integrity and sustainability of the microfinance industry. The following delineation presents the four primary regulatory strata along with their respective roles and implications:

Table 4 presents the four levels of regulation in the Moroccan microfinance sector, along with their theoretical foundations.

Table 4. Multi-Level Regulatory Framework for Microfinance Institutions with Theoretical Foundations.

Nature of Regulation	Regulatory Responsibility	Implications
Public Regulation	Central Bank – Supervisory Authority	The State bears responsibility for the stability of the financial system. Risk-based supervision allows authorities to monitor internal systems and risk management practices within MFIs rather than relying solely on external portfolio inspections. This approach can reduce systemic risk, as described by Kane (1995), by promoting better risk management and transparency, which, in turn, fosters greater investor confidence.
Sectoral Regulation (Oversight) / Self-Regulation	Professional Association	Sectoral bodies establish and promote industry specific standards, encouraging both institutional development and increased transparency. Sectoral regulation complements public regulation and internal controls and fills a critical gap in governance. However, this form of self-regulation cannot supplant the need for public oversight due to potential conflicts of interest and limitations in enforcement power (as highlighted by Tirole, 2006).
Internal Control	Internal MIS (Management Information System), Internal Audit, External Audit, Governance Bodies	Robust internal controls prevent excessive risk-taking and reduce the burden on external regulators. The importance of these controls is amplified under risk-based supervision. Effective internal control mechanisms are vital for ensuring the integrity of financial reporting and for aligning MFI operations with both regulatory requirements and ethical standards (as emphasized by COSO, 2013). They also serve as a critical mechanism for preventing fraud and mismanagement.
Market Discipline	Broad range of market actors (creditors, clients, investors)	Market discipline relies on transparency and the public disclosure of relevant information, including audited financial statements and institutional credit ratings. These measures enable market participants (creditors, clients, and investors) to evaluate the overall risk profile of MFIs. According to Stiglitz (2000), effective market discipline promotes greater accountability and efficiency within the financial system by incentivizing prudent behavior and penalizing excessive risk-taking. This can enhance overall financial stability.

These regulatory tiers function synergistically: While governmental monitoring ensures financial soundness and mandates adherence to standards, sector-specific guidelines and internal control mechanisms foster both robustness in institutional practices and a commitment to ethical conduct. Furthermore, the influence of market dynamics is increasingly prompting MFIs to prioritize transparency and superior performance across a spectrum of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics.

e. Case Studies

i. Microfinance in Senegal: Historical context and institutional typology

Table 5 presents the regulation of microfinance institutions in Senegal across three key periods.

Table 5. The Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in Senegal

Year	Description
1990	The microfinance sector in Senegal experienced rapid growth.
2003	The institution provided services to 510,883 clients, managing a loan portfolio of 57.8 billion CFA francs and outstanding savings balances of 42.99 billion CFA francs.
Currently	The decentralized financial sector in Senegal is characterized by a diverse array of over 600 registered entities, ranging from traditional cooperatives and savings groups to institutions governed by formal framework agreements.

The microfinance sector in Senegal is composed of three primary institutional types:

- Credit cooperatives, which mandate savings as a loan prerequisite and operate exclusively with their membership.
- Direct credit institutions.
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or development projects that incorporate a credit component into their activities.

In Senegal, the microfinance sector is supervised by the microfinance unit within the Ministry of Economy and Finance, in conjunction with the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).

Credit cooperatives are governed by the PARMEC Law (Law No. 95-03 of 5 January 1995 and its Decree No. 97-1106 of 11 November 1997), while other MFIs operate under renewable five-year framework agreements. Recognizing structural weaknesses, the Ministry of SMEs, Women’s Entrepreneurship and Microfinance was established in 2003 to promote the sector, and a new law (Law No. 2008-47 of 3 September 2008 and Decree No. 2008-1366 of 28 November 2008) was enacted in 2008 to address dysfunctions of the PARMEC Law:

- Failure to adhere to legal provisions.
- MIS failures.
- Weak supervision.
- Instances of fraud.

ii. Case of CAURIE-MF

1. Journey, mission, vision, and performance

CAURIE-MF (Crédit Autonome pour le Renforcement des Initiatives Économiques des Femmes au Sénégal – Microfinance) serves as an illustrative example of a microfinance institution operating in Senegal. Established in October 2005 by the Catholic Church of Senegal, CAURIE-MF focuses primarily on supporting women entrepreneurs and fostering the economic empowerment of Senegalese women. The institution offers targeted financial products, including loans and savings services, to meet the specific needs of its clientele.

CAURIE-MF plays a significant role in promoting financial inclusion and contributing to the economic development of women within the Senegalese context. As such, it exemplifies the diversity of actors in the country's microfinance sector and contributes to broader financial inclusion and poverty reduction goals.

2. Lifecycle and Institutional Evolution of CAURIE-MF

CAURIE-MF originated as a microfinance initiative between 1995 and 2005, spearheaded by Catholic Relief Services in partnership with CARITAS Senegal, targeting poverty reduction and economic empowerment among vulnerable populations. Between 2005 and 2008, the program transitioned into a private limited liability company, marking its first institutional transformation. Since 2009, it has operated as a licensed Savings and Credit Cooperative Society, reflecting its growing formalization within Senegal's financial sector.

The institution's mission centers on sustainably improving the livelihoods of underserved micro-entrepreneurs, with a particular focus on women, by offering tailored financial products and services. Its vision is to be recognized as a socially responsible and financially sustainable leader in microfinance service delivery. CAURIE-MF's core values are rooted in the principles of credit access for the poor, the ethical teachings of the Catholic Church, and adherence to best practices in microfinance.

CAURIE-MF has demonstrated notable operational performance while simultaneously contributing to youth employment opportunities within Senegal.

Operational and Financial Performance

Table 6 presents the key operational statistics of CAURIE-MF.

Table 6. Key Operational Statistics of CAURIE-MF as of 31 October 2019

Category	Data
Employees	203
Female Employees	82
Male Employees	121
Credit agents	126
Executives (including women)	17 (including 10 women)
Branches	10
Service points (outlets)	08

Note: Data adapted and interpreted from CAURIE-MF's 2019 annual report.

Table 7 presents the key financial and client performance indicators of CAURIE-MF.

Table 7. Key Financial and Client Performance Indicators of CAURIE-MF (as of 31 October 2019)

Indicator	Data
Number of clients	108 700
Savings portfolio	4.8 billion CFA francs
Loan portfolio	11.9 billion CFA francs
Number of active borrowers	8074
Percentage of women	96 %

Note: Data adapted and interpreted from CAURIE-MF's 2019 annual report.

As of October 2019, CAURIE-MF employed over 200 staff members, with women representing a significant portion of both employees and executives. The cooperative maintained 10 branches and 8 service points, serving approximately 108,700 clients, 96% of whom were women. The savings and loan portfolios stood at 4.8 billion and 11.9 billion CFA francs, respectively, highlighting the institution's substantial role in Senegal's microfinance landscape.

f. Response to the COVID-19 Crisis

While the operational success and development trajectory of CAURIE-MF have solidified its position as a pivotal actor in advancing financial inclusion and empowering women economically within Senegal, The onset of the COVID-19 crisis severely disrupted Senegal's microfinance sector, testing the financial stability and operational resilience of MFIs like CAURIE-MF. In response, state and sector actors swiftly implemented targeted interventions to support MFIs as they navigated this period of instability.

i. State and BCEAO Initiatives

- ❖ Temporary moratoria on loan repayments financed by state funds.
- ❖ Temporary suspension of specific taxes and levies (e.g., income tax).
- ❖ Facilitating indirect access for select MFIs to the BCEAO refinancing facility.
- ❖ Formal request to banks and MFIs to grant a three-month deferral of loan installments to affected clients, without incurring additional charges.
- ❖ Establishment of an Economic and Social Resilience Programme (PRES) with an allocated support fund for liquidity and portfolio financing (COVID-19 Response Fund).
- ❖ Issuance of special permits for professional travel.

While Senegal's government-backed loan moratoria, such as those under the PRES Fund, were widely implemented, their effectiveness is primarily evaluated using repayment rates self-reported by microfinance institutions (MFIs). However, these figures may not fully reveal underlying defaults or the extent of client attrition, as they can mask borrowers who quietly exit or fall into arrears without immediate detection. This limitation highlights the necessity for independent, post-crisis assessments to accurately verify outcomes and to identify persistent vulnerabilities among clients. Such external evaluations are crucial, as sector-wide data often lack the granularity needed to capture institutional or client-level risks, and may overlook the long-term impacts of deferred repayments and hidden distress within borrower portfolios.

ii. Actions by Professional Associations and Sectoral Coordination

- Enhanced communication with MFI clients and members through pooled resources for awareness campaigns promoting compliance with preventive health measures (e.g., posters, press releases).
- Harmonization and support of concerns raised by MFIs.
- Advocacy efforts directed toward public authorities regarding the expectations and needs of MFIs.
- Establishment of a coordinated crisis management strategy (Crisis Committee) for:
 - Collection and dissemination of relevant information.
 - Monitoring the progression of the pandemic.
 - Providing guidance to MFIs.

- Aligning key decisions (e.g., opening hours, credit repayment deferrals).
- Drafting an advocacy document outlining proposed actions expected from the Government, the BCEAO, and central technical and financial partners.
- Use of videoconferencing as a substitute for in-person meetings.

g. Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Response and Resilience

The preceding sections detailed the distinct regulatory frameworks of Morocco and Senegal and their respective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. This synthesis provides a direct comparative analysis, illustrating how these contextual differences influenced microfinance institutions' performance and stability.

Table 8 presents a comparative analysis of microfinance resilience and COVID-19 response between Morocco and Senegal.

Table 8: Microfinance Resilience & COVID-19 Response - Morocco vs. Senegal

Indicator / Aspect	Morocco	Senegal
PRE-PANDEMIC CONTEXT (2019)		
Regulatory Model	Unified (Bank Al-Maghrib)	Dual (BCEAO & Ministry)
Digital Penetration	35% (World Bank Findex, 2017)	48% (World Bank Findex, 2017)
Portfolio at Risk >30 days	5.8% (BAM, 2019)	7.3% (RIM, 2019)
CRISIS RESPONSE (2020)		
Key Measure	Mandatory 6-month blanket moratorium	Case-by-case restructuring
Financial Support	"Damane Oxygen" fund (~\$200M)	"FONSIS" liquidity line (~\$70M)
POST-CRISIS IMPACT		
Loan Portfolio Change	-6.5% (Contraction)	+3.2% (Growth)
PAR Peak	14.3% (Q4 2020)	11.5% (Q3 2020)
Client Retention	-11.4% loss of borrowers	-2.1% loss of borrowers

The data reveal two divergent crisis management models. Morocco implemented a mandatory six-month blanket moratorium. Senegal implemented case-by-case restructuring. Morocco's loan portfolio contracted by -6.5%. Senegal's loan portfolio grew by +3.2%. Morocco's PAR peak reached 14.3% in Q4 2020. Senegal's PAR peak reached 11.5% in Q3 2020. Morocco lost 11.4% of its borrowers. Senegal lost 2.1% of its borrowers. Morocco's regulatory model is unified under Bank Al-Maghrib. Senegal's regulatory model is dual (BCEAO plus Ministry of Economy and Finance). Digital penetration is 35% in Morocco and 48% in Senegal.

h. Synthesis of Findings

The analysis of the Senegalese microfinance sector, exemplified by CAURIE-MF, shows that state authorities and professional associations implemented loan moratoria, tax suspensions, and liquidity support. These interventions maintained operational continuity for MFIs during the COVID-19 crisis.

When compared with Morocco, the data show that Morocco's centralized model produced a 14.3% PAR peak and 6.5% portfolio contraction. Senegal's decentralized model produced an 11.5% PAR peak and 3.2% portfolio growth. Senegal achieved 2.1% client loss compared to Morocco's 11.4% client loss.

5. Discussion

a. Interpretation of Comparative Results

The divergent outcomes between Morocco and Senegal can be explained by three causal factors.

First, Morocco's centralized supervision model (Bank Al-Maghrib) enabled rapid, uniform implementation of the mandatory six-month moratorium. However, this blanket approach merely deferred risk rather than mitigating it, as evidenced by the PAR peak reaching 14.3% in Q4 2020 when moratoria expired, creating a "cliff effect" of delayed defaults. In contrast, Senegal's case-by-case restructuring allowed MFIs to assess borrower viability individually, resulting in a lower PAR peak (11.5%) and continued portfolio growth (+3.2%).

Second, Senegal's higher digital finance penetration (48% versus 35% in Morocco, World Bank Findex 2017) enabled remote loan monitoring, digital repayments, and virtual client communication during lockdowns, reducing operational disruption. This technological advantage was absent in Morocco, where many MFIs relied on in-person collection, contributing to portfolio contraction (-6.5%).

Third, Senegal's dual regulatory framework (BCEAO central bank plus Ministry of Economy and Finance) created redundancy that proved beneficial during crisis. While this duality can cause coordination delays in normal times, during COVID-19 it provided multiple channels for liquidity support: MFIs could access BCEAO refinancing facilities and the government's PRES fund simultaneously. Morocco's unified framework, while efficient in normal times, concentrated all crisis response through Bank Al-Maghrib, creating a single point of failure when demand for support exceeded initial projections.

This systematic comparison underlines that despite differing regulatory stringency, effective governance and risk management remain central to institutional resilience in both countries. The key difference lies in how these principles are applied: top-down and uniform in Morocco versus adaptive and decentralized in Senegal.

The findings of this review demonstrate that the evolution of regulatory frameworks and institutional practices has played a crucial role in shaping the performance and resilience of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in both Senegal and Morocco. In Senegal, the application of the PARMEC Law and subsequent BCEAO directives has contributed to sector stability and professionalization, yet challenges remain in ensuring transparency and independent verification of MFI performance data (Diop, 2020). The case study of CAURIE-MF illustrates how institutional adaptability and a focus on women's entrepreneurship can enhance outreach and resilience, even as the sector continues to face systemic risks and data limitations.

A comparative perspective highlights Morocco's more centralized and diversified regulatory approach, exemplified by the establishment of FNAME and the implementation of ethical codes of conduct. The Moroccan experience, particularly following the 2007 debt crisis, underscores the importance of robust supervision, credit information systems, and coordinated stakeholder action in maintaining sector stability and protecting clients.

These observations support the working hypothesis that effective regulation is most impactful when combined with proactive institutional strategies and sectoral coordination. The COVID-19 pandemic further emphasized the value of timely interventions, such as loan moratoria and

liquidity support, in mitigating immediate financial pressures on MFIs and their clients. However, these measures also revealed the need for greater regulatory flexibility and risk management capacity, echoing the calls in the literature for adaptive and risk-based supervision (Ledgerwood, 2013, p. 112; Diop, 2020, p. 48).

b. Specific Theoretical Contributions

This study contributes to four specific debates in the microfinance literature, as detailed below.

First, the findings support Ledgerwood's (2013) argument that hybrid regulatory models—combining prudential supervision with non-prudential tools—are particularly suited to microfinance contexts (Ledgerwood, 2013, p. 87). However, this study extends Ledgerwood's framework by demonstrating that hybrid models require different configurations during crises. While Ledgerwood focused on normal operating conditions, the Senegal case shows that dual supervision (BCEAO plus Ministry of Economy and Finance) provided redundancy that proved beneficial during COVID-19. Specifically, MFIs could access both BCEAO refinancing facilities and the government's PRES fund simultaneously. In contrast, Morocco's unified model, while efficient in normal times, created a single point of failure when demand for support exceeded initial projections. This extends Ledgerwood's theory to crisis contexts, showing that institutional redundancy becomes a virtue during systemic shocks.

Second, the findings engage with Tirole's (2006) theory on the limits of self-regulation. Tirole argued that self-regulatory organizations cannot replace public oversight due to conflicts of interest and limitations in enforcement power (Tirole, 2006, p. 312). This study confirms Tirole's argument empirically using COVID-19 evidence. While

Morocco's FNAME played an important role in establishing ethical codes of conduct and representing MFIs before public authorities, it lacked the enforcement power to address liquidity shortages during the pandemic. Only Bank Al-Maghrib's public authority could mandate loan moratoria, provide refinancing through the "Damane Oxygen" fund, and enforce compliance. This extends Tirole's theory by showing that self-regulation gaps become most visible and consequential during crisis periods, when private coordination mechanisms are most likely to fail.

Third, the CAURIE-MF case study contributes to the financial performance versus social performance (FP-SP) debate. Mfossa et al. (2013) documented a persistent tension between FP and SP, suggesting that MFIs must sacrifice one for the other (Mfossa et al., 2013, p. 95). However, CAURIE-MF contradicts this assumption. With 96% women clients (social mission focus), a loan portfolio of 11.9 billion CFA francs, and post-crisis portfolio growth of +3.2% (financial performance), CAURIE-MF demonstrates that a focus on vulnerable populations is compatible with robust financial health, even during crisis. This suggests that the FP-SP trade-off may be context-dependent rather than universal. The key enabling factors appear to be conservative lending practices, adherence to BCEAO liquidity requirements, and a governance structure that prioritizes both social and financial objectives simultaneously.

Fourth, the comparative analysis contributes to the literature on crisis management in financial systems. Bini Smaghi (2021) argued that emergency responses require centralization for speed and uniform implementation (Bini Smaghi, 2021, p. 8). This study challenges that assumption using empirical evidence from the microfinance sector. While Morocco's centralized response was faster to implement, Senegal's decentralized approach produced better outcomes on three metrics: portfolio growth (+3.2% vs -6.5%), PAR peak (11.5% vs 14.3%), and client retention (-2.1% vs -11.4%). This suggests that in microfinance contexts, where borrower heterogeneity is high and relationships matter, flexibility and adaptability may be more valuable than speed

alone. The implication is that crisis response models must be calibrated to the specific characteristics of the financial sector being regulated.

c. Summary of Theoretical Contributions

The main theoretical contributions of this study are summarized in Table 9.

Table 9: Synthesis of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence

Author	Original Argument	This Study's Contribution	Evidence from Data
Ledgerwood (2013)	Hybrid regulatory models suit microfinance contexts	EXTENDS to crisis contexts	Senegal's dual model enabled access to both BCEAO and PRES funds
Tirole (2006)	Self-regulation has inherent limits	CONFIRMS empirically with COVID-19 evidence	FNAM lacked enforcement power; only Bank Al-Maghrib could mandate moratoria
Mfossa et al. (2013)	Financial vs social performance trade-off exists	CHALLENGES using CAURIE-MF evidence	96% women clients + 11.9B CFA portfolio + 3.2% growth
Bini Smaghi (2021)	Centralization enables faster crisis response	CHALLENGES in microfinance context	Senegal's decentralized approach outperformed Morocco on 3 metrics

Nevertheless, the review identifies persistent gaps, particularly regarding the reliability of self-reported data and the limited use of independent audits or client-level surveys. Addressing these shortcomings is essential for improving transparency, accountability, and the overall effectiveness of microfinance regulation (Ledgerwood, 2013, p. 156).

In the broader context, these findings reinforce the importance of tailoring regulatory frameworks to local institutional realities while drawing on best practices from comparative experiences. Future research should focus on the long-term effects of regulatory reforms, the integration of digital financial services, and the development of standardized impact measurement tools. Expanding comparative studies across additional WAEMU countries would further illuminate best practices and institutional divergences. Finally, greater emphasis on independent evaluation and robust data collection will be critical for advancing financial inclusion and sector sustainability in the years ahead.

d. Policy Implications

The findings of this review yield several actionable policy implications for regulators, policymakers, and practitioners in the microfinance sector. These recommendations are operationalized below with specific responsible actors, timelines, and measurable targets.

i. For Senegal

- Recommendation 1 - Enhance Non-Financial Supervision

By December 31, 2026, the BCEAO, in coordination with Senegal's Ministry of Economy and Finance, shall require all MFIs with a loan portfolio exceeding 5 billion CFA francs to submit independent social performance audits every two years. These audits must verify compliance with client protection principles, transparency requirements, and ethical conduct standards.

MFIs failing to submit audits for two consecutive cycles shall be subject to progressive sanctions, starting with a formal warning and escalating to suspension of new lending activities.

- Recommendation 2 - Promote Innovation within Prudential Norms:

By March 31, 2026, the BCEAO shall establish a regulatory "sandbox" allowing 3 to 5 selected Senegalese MFIs to test digital financial products (including mobile savings and parametric microinsurance) under reduced prudential requirements but enhanced monitoring. The sandbox shall operate for an 18-month pilot period, after which successful models may be scaled nationally. Participating MFIs must have a minimum of 50,000 active clients and a PAR below 5% for the preceding two quarters.

ii. For Morocco

- Recommendation 3 - Improve Social Performance Monitoring

By December 31, 2026, Bank Al-Maghrib, in consultation with FNAM, shall issue a revised Governance Directive requiring all licensed MFIs to publish annually the following standardized social metrics: (a) percentage of women clients; (b) percentage of clients below the national poverty line; (c) client satisfaction score (measured by annual survey); (d) client retention rate; and (e) average loan size as a percentage of GDP per capita. These metrics shall be audited by an independent third party and made publicly available on Bank Al-Maghrib's website.

- Recommendation 4 - Introduce Incentives for Transparent Governance

By June 30, 2027, Bank Al-Maghrib shall implement a tiered supervision framework classifying MFIs into three categories based on portfolio size: Tier 1 (portfolio > 1 billion MAD), Tier 2 (portfolio between 100 million and 1 billion MAD), and Tier 3 (portfolio < 100 million MAD). Tier 1 MFIs shall undergo full on-site supervision annually; Tier 2 MFIs biennially; Tier 3 MFIs every three years. Additionally, Tier 1 MFIs that maintain independent audits, publish social metrics, and achieve PAR below 5% for four consecutive quarters shall receive a 0.5% reduction in mandatory reserve requirements.

iii. For WAEMU Regional Initiatives

- Recommendation 5 - Foster Knowledge Exchange

By September 30, 2026, the BCEAO shall establish a bi-annual WAEMU Microfinance Regulatory Forum, rotating among member states. Each forum shall include technical workshops on crisis management, digital transformation, and hybrid regulatory models. Each member state shall send up to three representatives (one regulator, one MFI practitioner, one academic researcher). A written synthesis report with actionable recommendations shall be published within 60 days of each forum.

- Recommendation 6 - Institutionalize Crisis Response Frameworks

By December 31, 2026, the BCEAO shall issue a binding directive establishing automatic crisis response protocols for WAEMU member states. The directive shall include: (a) automatic activation of a regional liquidity facility of 100 billion CFA francs when sector-wide PAR exceeds 10% for two consecutive quarters; (b) mandatory 3-month loan moratorium for clients in declared disaster zones; (c) expedited refinancing access for MFIs with pre-crisis PAR below 8%. These protocols shall be reviewed and updated every three years based on post-crisis evaluations.

- Recommendation 7 - Strengthen Data Verification

By June 30, 2027, the BCEAO shall require all WAEMU MFIs with more than 10,000 active clients to: (a) undergo annual external audits by BCEAO-approved audit firms; (b) submit quarterly standardized reports using a common digital reporting template; (c) maintain a management information system capable of generating real-time portfolio quality data. BCEAO shall provide technical assistance and partial funding (up to 30% of implementation costs) for MFIs with fewer than 50,000 clients to upgrade their information systems.

Implementation Timeline:

The implementation timeline and associated monitoring framework are presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Implementation Timeline and Monitoring Framework

Recommendation	Responsible Body	Deadline	Key Performance Indicator
R1: Non-financial supervision	BCEAO + Senegal Ministry	Dec 31, 2026	100% of large MFIs submit audits
R2: Regulatory sandbox	BCEAO	Mar 31, 2026	3-5 MFIs actively testing products
R3: Social metrics	Bank Al-Maghrib + FNAM	Dec 31, 2026	5 standardized metrics published
R4: Tiered supervision	Bank Al-Maghrib	Jun 30, 2027	3-tier classification implemented
R5: Knowledge exchange	BCEAO	Sep 30, 2026	First forum held
R6: Crisis protocols	BCEAO	Dec 31, 2026	Binding directive issued
R7: Data verification	BCEAO	Jun 30, 2027	100% of large MFIs audited

Finally, ongoing stakeholder dialogue—including input from MFIs, clients, and sector associations—should inform all regulatory reforms to ensure that frameworks remain responsive to evolving market conditions. A formal consultation mechanism with written feedback loops shall be established by December 31, 2026.

e. Limitations

Despite its comprehensive scope, this review is subject to several limitations. The analysis focuses primarily on Senegal and Morocco, which may limit the generalizability of findings to other contexts with different regulatory environments or market structures. Data limitations persist, particularly regarding the reliability and completeness of self-reported information from MFIs, as not all institutions adopt transparent reporting practices or undergo independent verification. This can result in an incomplete or mixed picture of sector performance and risks. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of the analysis precludes assessment of long-term regulatory impacts, especially as the effects of reforms and crisis interventions may take years to materialize. Furthermore, the study does not incorporate primary data collection, such as client-level surveys or in-depth interviews with regulatory personnel, which could provide richer insights into the lived experiences of stakeholders. Future research should employ longitudinal designs, incorporate client-level surveys, and leverage randomized controlled trials where feasible to better evaluate the causal effects of regulatory changes and sectoral interventions.

6. Conclusion

This comparative analysis of Senegal and Morocco demonstrates that centralised supervision, as observed in Morocco, enables rapid and coordinated crisis responses but may defer underlying risks, whereas a more decentralised supervisory model, as in Senegal, offers greater institutional flexibility and stronger client retention, albeit with increased coordination challenges.

Microfinance has thus emerged as a key driver of economic development in both countries, particularly through its contributions to employment generation and financial inclusion. Significant progress has been made in strengthening regulatory frameworks and fostering institutional collaboration, with an increasing emphasis on client protection and sector resilience. Partnerships among public authorities, microfinance institutions (MFIs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have played a central role in promoting a more inclusive and robust financial ecosystem. However, rigorous evaluations, including randomised controlled trials, indicate that while microfinance expands access to credit and supports entrepreneurial activity, its short- to medium-term effects on household income and broader social indicators remain relatively modest (Ledgerwood, 2013).

From a theoretical perspective, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of how institutional frameworks and regulatory adaptations shape financial inclusion, particularly during crisis periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Diop, 2020). It highlights the heterogeneity of microfinance outcomes—shaped by factors such as gender and prior entrepreneurial experience—and underscores the importance of adaptive, context-sensitive regulatory models capable of responding to evolving sectoral challenges. From a practical standpoint, the findings emphasise the relevance of socially oriented financial models, as illustrated by CAURIE-MF, in empowering women and vulnerable populations, while fostering innovation in client protection and outreach strategies.

Nevertheless, this study is subject to several limitations. Its focus on Senegal and Morocco may restrict the generalisability of the findings. In addition, the reliance on secondary and self-reported data from MFIs and regulatory authorities introduces potential biases and limits the ability to establish causal relationships in complex real-world settings. These constraints highlight the need for more robust and diversified empirical approaches.

Future research should extend this analysis to a broader range of West African countries in order to better capture regional dynamics and regulatory diversity. Greater reliance on primary data collection—such as client-level surveys, independent audits, and interviews with regulatory stakeholders—would enhance the reliability and depth of analysis. Longitudinal studies are also needed to assess the long-term effects of regulatory reforms on institutional sustainability, outreach, and portfolio quality. Furthermore, experimental approaches, including randomised controlled trials, could be employed to evaluate innovative financial products and delivery mechanisms, particularly for women, youth, and rural populations. Finally, mixed-method approaches combining quantitative and qualitative techniques would provide a more comprehensive understanding of microfinance system effectiveness.

In conclusion, the effectiveness of microfinance regulation does not depend on a single universal model, but rather on its alignment with local institutional contexts, its capacity to respond to crises, and its ability to integrate flexible and adaptive governance mechanisms. Continued research and policy innovation therefore remain essential to ensure that microfinance sustainably advances financial inclusion and resilience across diverse African contexts.

7. References

- Bank Al-Maghrib. (2019). Rapport sur le Microcrédit 2019 [Annual Microcredit Report 2019].
- Bank Al-Maghrib. (2020). *Circulaire n° 3/W/2020 relative aux mesures de soutien face à la COVID-19* [Circular No. 3/W/2020 on support measures in response to COVID-19].
- Bank Al-Maghrib. (2021). Rapport sur le Microcrédit 2021 [Annual Microcredit Report 2021].
- Bank Al-Maghrib. (2023). Microfinance supervision report. BAM.
- Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) (2020). *Mesures de la BCEAO face à la crise de la COVID-19.
- BCEAO – Direction de la Stabilité Financière. (2021). La réglementation de la microfinance en Afrique de l'Ouest: Enjeux et perspectives. <https://www.bceao.int/fr/content/la-reglementation-de-lamicrofinance-en-afrique-de-louest-enjeux-et-perspectives>
- Bitegetsimana, A. (2023). Les mécanismes d'audit interne et efficacité des institutions de microfinance de la ville de Goma. *IJRDO Journal of Business Management*, 9(1), 1–15. <https://ijrdo.org/index.php/bm/article/view/5679>
- CAURIE-MF. (2019). Rapport annuel d'activités 2019. Caurie Microfinance.
- CGAP. (2006). Good practice guidelines for funders of microfinance. World Bank. <https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/good-practice-guidelines-funders-microfinance>
- Christen, R. P., & Rosenberg, R. (2000). Reforming microfinance regulation in Africa. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). <https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/reforming-microfinance-regulation-africa>
- COSO. (2013). Internal control-integrated framework. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. <https://www.coso.org/Pages/ic.aspx>
- Diagne, A. (2017). Strengthening governance in microfinance institutions: The experience of Senegal. *Revue Tiers Monde*, 229(1), 163–180. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rtm.229.0163>
- Diop, A. (2020). Regulatory challenges.
- Diop, M. (2020). Adéquation des services et produits des institutions de microfinance aux besoins des personnes à faible revenu: L'exemple du Sénégal (Doctoral dissertation, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Senegal).
- Diop, S. (2018). Micro-prêts collectifs et amélioration de la performance des groupements villageois: Enquête à Kolda (Sénégal). *Political Science*, 15(2), 45–60.
- FONSI (Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques du Sénégal) (2020). *Communiqué de presse : FONSI active sa plateforme de garantie et de refinancement pour soutenir les PME face au COVID-19.
- Gassama, M. (2011). Microfinance et développement local: Le cas du Sénégal. *Political Science*, 8(3), 112–130.
- Helms, B., & Lauer, K. (2020). COVID-19 and microfinance: Strategies for resilience. CGAP Blog. <https://www.cgap.org/blog/covid-19-and-microfinance-strategies-resilience>
- Kane, E. J. (1995). Three paradigms for the role of capital in financial regulation. In *Proceedings of the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition* (pp. 1–30). Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

- Lamrani Alaoui, Y., & Tkiouat, M. (2017). Assessing the performance of microfinance lending process using AHP-fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method. *Economics and Business*, 5(1), 23–35. <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=82395>
- Ledgerwood, J. (2013). Transforming microfinance institutions: Providing full financial services to the poor. World Bank Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9480-1>
- Ledgerwood, J., & White, V. (2006). Microfinance regulation and supervision in Sub-Saharan Africa: The challenge of balancing social and financial performance (CGAP Working Paper). World Bank. <https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/microfinance-regulation-and-supervision-sub-saharan-africa>
- Mbouombouo Mfossa, P.-H., et al. (2013). Performance sociale versus performance financière. *Political Science*, 10, 88–102.
- Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (2020). Communiqué on the "Damane Oxygen" Guarantee Fund.
- République du Sénégal. (1995). Loi n° 95-03 du 5 janvier 1995 portant réglementation des activités mutualistes ou coopératives d'épargne et de crédit au Sénégal [PARMEC Law]. *Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal*. <https://www.dri.gouv.sn/loi-n%C2%B0199503-du-05-janvier-1995>
- Réseau des Institutions de Microfinance (RIM) - Senegal (2019, 2021). Rapport Annuel.
- Roodman, D. (2012). Due diligence: An impertinent inquiry into microfinance. Center for Global Development. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022651>
- Schreiner, M. (2002). Aspects of outreach: A framework for discussion of the social benefits of microfinance. *Journal of International Development*, 14(5), 591–603. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.908>
- Seck, M. (2019). Complémentarité Banque islamique du Sénégal/institutions de microfinance: Un modèle de financement inclusif et durable des PME sénégalaises. *Economics and Business*, 7(2), 55–70.
- Smaghi, L. B. (2021). La capacité de réaction des banques dans la crise de la COVID-19. Banca d'Italia. <https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-vari/int-var-2021/smaghi-covid19.pdf>
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). Capital market liberalization, economic growth, and instability. *World Development*, 28(6), 1075–1086. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X\(00\)00006-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00006-6)
- The World Bank (2017). Global Findex Database.
- Tirole, J. (2006). *The theory of corporate finance*. Princeton University Press. <https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691125565/the-theory-of-corporate-finance>
- World Bank. (2013). *The new microfinance handbook: A financial market system perspective*. World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8927-0> <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/233251468182337007/pdf/The-new-microfinance-handbook-a-financial-market-system-perspective.pdf>