Inflation Dynamics in Morocco: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Inflation and Central Bank Independence (1998–2009)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71420/ijref.v3i11-1.454Keywords:
Cukierman index, independence, Central Bank, Morocco, Inflation, CPIAbstract
In this article, we examine the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Morocco. The theory of inflationary bias and several empirical studies suggest the existence of a negative relationship, in the sense that greater central bank independence leads to lower inflation rates. The econometric model used in this article confirms, for the period 1998–2009, that in the long run, greater central bank independence leads to lower inflation, and that a change in the central bank’s charter or the implementation of new measures aimed at curbing inflationary pressures triggers reactions among economic agents that result in a reduction in inflationary pressures. The results also show that a change in the central bank’s charter alone is not sufficient to influence inflationary pressures over the long term, and that for central bank independence to be beneficial in terms of controlling inflation, it must be accompanied by genuine independence (Cukierman 1992, Cukierman 2008) and a fairly significant degree of liberalization in a given economy.Downloads
Published
2026-11-19
How to Cite
Sidki, S. (2026). Inflation Dynamics in Morocco: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Inflation and Central Bank Independence (1998–2009). International Journal of Research in Economics and Finance, 3(11-1), 99–114. https://doi.org/10.71420/ijref.v3i11-1.454
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Copyright (c) 2026 Selma Sidki

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